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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES J. QUINN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030848-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs (DUI), a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2001); keeping an 
open container in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 
(2001); and driving without a license for the class of motor vehicle, a class C 
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-207 (2001), in the First Judicial District, 
Cache County, the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly sentence defendant for third-degree felony DUI with 
prior convictions where the court, acting as trier-of-fact, had explicitly found every 
element of the crime and had conveyed, if not formally announced, its verdict? 
No standard of review applies. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one third degree felony—driving under the influence 
of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) within ten years of two or more prior convictions. Rl-2. 
He was also charged with three class C misdemeanors—carrying an open container in his 
vehicle, driving a class of motor vehicle without being licensed in that class, and driving 
with defective equipment. Id. Defendant moved to dismiss the felony DUI charge, 
arguing that ex post facto and due process protections prohibited any enhancement of his 
conviction on the basis of his prior convictions. R33, 37-43. The parties filed 
memoranda on the motion. R37-43, 46-58. Following argument on the matter, the trial 
court denied the motion. R65-66, 69-72; MT.1 
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial. R77, 79. On September 6, 2002, the 
trial court conducted a bench trial. R81-82, TT. The court found defendant guilty of the 
DUI. TT66. The court also found that the State had produced evidence of two 
convictions within the ten-year period preceding the DUI offense. Id.; see also R56-58, 
81-83 One of the convictions, entered March 12, 1993, followed a trial. TT63; see also 
R58. The other, entered October 12, 1993, was based on a guilty plea. TT63; see also 
R56-57. 
At the close of trial, defendant claimed that the State had the burden to show not 
only the fact of the previous convictions, but also that the guilty plea, upon which the 
The transcripts in this case have not been assigned record numbers. The State 
therefore refers to the transcripts of the proceedings as MT (hearing on motion to 
dismiss), TT (trial), and ST (sentencing hearing). 
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October 1993 conviction was predicated, had been voluntarily entered. TT67-68. The 
Court found defendant "guilty of at least the lesser included offense of DUI," but 
reserved disposition of the third degree felony enhancement issue until the parties could 
brief defendant's burden of proof claim. TT67-68. The trial court set a hearing on the 
matter and sentencing for November 26, 2002. R.104. Defendant did not appear. R105. 
Defendant was apprehended on a bench warrant and appeared at a hearing on 
September 4, 2003, almost one year later. R109-110. The court reset sentencing for 
September 15, 2003. R109. The trial court opened the sentencing hearing by stating, "I 
understand we have a third degree felony, driving under the influence. Driving with the 
wrong class of license and an open container. Any reason sentence should not be passed 
at this time?" ST2. Defense counsel responded, "No, Your Honor." Id. 
The court then asked defense counsel, "Anything you or your client would like to 
say?" Id. Defense counsel responded, "Just that I've had the opportunity to review the 
presentence report with defendant in this particular matter. We would note to the court 
that the two prior DUI offenses occurred approximately nine-and-a-half years ago. This 
is a third DUI that did occur within the ten year statutory period." Id. 
The court asked defendant if he would like to say anything. Id. Defendant said 
that he was sorry and took full responsibility for his actions. Id. 
The court sentenced defendant to serve a prison term of no more than five years on 
the DUI charge and ordered concurrent ten-day jail sentences on the wrong class of 
license and open container charges. Id. at 3. 
Defendant timely appealed. Rl 17. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Shortly after midnight on August 8, 2001, Sergeant Brett Randall of the Logan 
City Police Department saw defendant driving a blue car with the headlights off. TT3, 5. 
He also observed the passenger taking drinks from what appeared to be a beer can. Id. at 
4. He turned on his overhead lights and pulled the car over. Id. at 4-5. 
As he approached the car, he noticed that the driver was wearing only his boxer 
shorts. M a t 5. A heavy odor of alcohol emanated from the vehicle. Id. The driver's 
speech was slow and slurred. Id. His eyes were bloodshot. Id. at 6. Officer Randall 
asked defendant to step out of his car. Id. at 8. He noticed that defendant swayed when 
he walked and had difficulty keeping his balance. Id. 
Officer Randall asked defendant whether he had been drinking, and defendant said 
that he had drunk "two or three." Id. at 9. The officer assumed that defendant was 
referring to two or three beers. Id. The officer then informed defendant that he was 
going to give him some tests to determine whether or not it would be safe for him to drive 
home. Id. The officer performed various field sobriety tests, and defendant was unable 
to perform the required tasks. Id. at 9-17. 
The officer then administered a breathalyzer test. Id. at 17. The portable breath 
machine registered positive for the presence of alcohol in defendant's breath, but because 
defendant could not or would not blow a breath of sufficient length, the officer could not 
get a proper alcohol level reading. Id. at 18. Based on his experience and observations, 
however, the officer determined that defendant was "[ejxtremely intoxicated"— 
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"intoxicated to the point that he couldn't safely operate a motor vehicle/5 and arrested 
him. Id. at 19. 
Upon searching defendant's car, the officer found an open container of alcohol 
wedged between a seat occupied by defendant's passenger and the passenger-side door. 
Id. at 20. The officer later ran a check on defendant's driver's license and found that it 
had expired. Id. at 23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly imposed a sentence for third degree felony DUI with prior 
convictions. While the court did not formally announce its verdict, its uncontroverted 
informal statement, "I understand we are here on a third degree felony, driving under the 
influence," conveyed its verdict. All parties knew that the trial court had found every 
element of the felony DUI and only withheld a formal announcement of verdict to allow 
defendant to argue that the prior convictions could not be used to enhance his conviction. 
Defendant had abandoned his efforts to make that argument prior to sentencing, the 
argument was contrary to controlling law, and defendant does not reassert it on appeal. 
As to his claim regarding announcement of the verdict, if any error occurred, 
defendant invited it when, prior to sentencing, he affirmatively represented to the trial 
court that there was no reason that sentence should not be passed on defendant's third 
degree felony conviction. Moreover, if defendant has any remedy, it is not vacation of 
his felony sentence and imposition of a misdemeanor sentence. At most, he is entitled to 
have the trial court formally enter a guilty verdict on the felony DUI charge and then 
sentence him again to the term it originally imposed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IMPOSED A SENTENCE FOR 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY DUI WITH PRIOR CONVICTIONS; 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INFORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS 
VERDICT SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION 
Defendant claims that his "sentence for [the felony] DUI was patently illegal in 
that [the trial court] sentenced him to a sentence consistent to that of a 3rd degree felony 
when defendant^ was only found guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Br. Appellant at 7. 
In making his claim, defendant suggests that he was acquitted of the felony charge. He 
was not. The record makes clear that the trial court and both parties understood that 
defendant was guilty of a felony. The only issue for this Court is whether the trial court's 
informal pre-sentencing announcement of defendant's guilt sufficed to support his 
conviction or whether the case must be remanded for formal announcement of the 
verdict.2 
A. If any error occurred, it was only that the trial court did not more formally 
announce the verdict. Defendant invited that error, and this Court should 
therefore reject his claim. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him on a third degree 
felony because it "failed to rule on the enhancement from a class B misdemeanor to a 3 
degree felony." Br. Appellant at 7. If the trial court erred, defendant invited the error by 
affirmatively representing that there was no reason that sentence should not be 
pronounced. The court began the sentencing hearing with a statement and a question. "I 
2
 On January 20, 2005, the State moved for summary reversal on the basis that 
defendant was entitled to the benefit of a change in the law. On February 9, 2005, this 
Court denied the motion. The State does not re-address the issue in this brief. 
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understand we have a third degree felony, driving under the influence Any reason 
sentence should not be pronounced at this time." ST2. Defense counsel stated, "No, 
Your Honor." Id. 
By that statement, defendant affirmatively represented that nothing more remained 
to be done before the court sentenced defendant on the third degree felony DUI. 
Defendant may well have done this because the trial court had informed him off-the-
record that it was rejecting his argument that the State had the burden of proving that his 
prior conviction was based on a voluntarily-entered guilty plea. Where "a party through 
counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court 
into error, [the appellate court] will then decline to save that party from the error." State 
v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, \ 25, 52 P.3d 1210 (citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 
1989)). This Court should reject defendant's argument on this ground alone. 
B. Defendant was not "only found guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Rather, the 
trial court clearly found him guilty of third degree felony DUI. 
The record does not support defendant's claim that he was convicted of only a 
class B misdemeanor. Indeed, defendant acknowledged below that his conviction was for 
third degree felony DUI. As stated, the trial court's opening remarks at the sentencing 
hearing were "I understand we have a third degree felony, driving under the 
influence. .. . Any reason sentence should not be passed at this time?" ST2. Defense 
counsel responded, "No, Your Honor." Id. When asked whether he had anything to say, 
defense counsel observed, "This is a third DUI that did occur within the ten year statutory 
period." Id. That statement was a clear allusion to third degree felony DUI. Thus, at 
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sentencing defendant understood and acknowledged that his conviction was for a third 
degree felony. 
Without acknowledging his concession below, defendant asserts for the first time 
on appeal that "[t]he trial court found [him] guilty of a DUI, a class B misdemeanor." Br. 
Appellant at 7. That assertion is not supported by the record, nor can it be inferred from 
the record. Defendant asks this Court to infer that the trial court acquitted him because 
the trial court's only announcement of its verdict was its statement, "I understand we 
have a third degree felony." ST2. Defendant thereby asks for an unreasonable reading of 
the record. 
The court's findings at the bench trial refute defendant's claim that he was 
convicted of only a class B misdemeanor. The trial court found every element of felony 
DUI. 
The version of the statute in effect at the time of the August 8, 2001 DUI offense 
provided: 
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person . . . is under the influence of alcohol, 
any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree 
that renders the person incapable of safely operating that vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a) (2001). The enhancement provision of the statute 
provided: "A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is 
committed . . . within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (2001). 
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The evidence presented at trial required the trial court, sitting as trier-of-fact, to 
make a credibility determination. The trial court credited Officer Randall's testimony 
that defendant was "[e]xtremely intoxicated"—"intoxicated to the point that he couldn't 
safely drive." TT19, 66. Based on this testimony, the court found defendant guilty of the 
August 2001 DUI. Id at 66. Defendant has not challenged this finding. 
The State also presented evidence of two prior convictions. One of the 
convictions, entered March 12, 1993, followed a trial. TT63; see also R58. The other, 
entered October 12, 1993, was based on a guilty plea. TT63; see also R56-57. The court 
found that the State had met its burden to present evidence of two convictions within the 
ten-year period preceding the August 2001 DUI offense. TT66. 
As stated, however, defendant argued in closing argument that one of the prior 
convictions, the conviction based on a guilty plea, could not be used to enhance the 
August 2001 DUI. TT64. Defendant claimed that the State had the burden to show that 
his 1993 guilty plea was "freely and voluntarily" entered and "that all of the 
constitutional rights of the defendant were given to [him]" at the time he entered the plea. 
TT69, 73. Defendant claimed that the State had not met that burden. Id. at 64. 
Responding to that argument, the trial court found that the State had not introduced any 
evidence "as to the procedures that took place on the original trial court level at the 
municipal court." TT66. 
The court, however, was not convinced that the State actually had the burden to 
introduce such evidence. The court stated that the argument was "new to me." TT 69. 
The court told defense counsel, "Now, what I'll do, Mr. Skabelund, if you want to pursue 
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that, I'll allow you to brief the issue The purpose for that is to determine whether or 
not it is a third degree felony or a lesser included offense of DUI [,] a class B 
misdemeanor. I found [defendant] guilty of the class B misdemeanor. It's whether or not 
he's guilty of the enhancement as well." TT67. The court further instructed, "I have 
found [defendant] guilty of at least the lesser included offense of DUI. So the argument 
is only as to whether or not it should be enhanced." TT67-68 (emphasis added). 
The court then set sentencing for November 4, 2002. TT74. The court ordered 
that defendant report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for preparation of a 
presentence investigation report. Id. He ordered that AP&P "make recommendations as 
if the defendant were convicted of a third degree felony." Id. The court stated that it 
would consider the parties' pleadings on defendant's claim on November 4 prior to 
sentencing. Id. 
Defendant filed a brief in support of his claim regarding the State's burden. R87-
91. The State filed a response. R92-98. Defendant then filed a motion for continuance 
of sentencing so that he could file a reply to the State's response. R100. The trial court 
granted the motion. R104. The court set a hearing on the matter and sentencing for 
November 26, 2004. Id. Defendant never filed a reply. Moreover, defendant did not 
appear for sentencing. R105. 
When defendant was apprehended on a bench warrant almost one year later, the 
trial court again calendared the sentencing hearing. R109-110. Sentencing proceeded, 
but defendant never again mentioned his claim that the State had an unmet burden to 
show that the prior guilty plea was voluntary and that defendant was advised of his 
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constitutional rights when he entered it. See ST. Rather, defendant acceded to the trial 
court's characterization of the matter to be decided, "I understand we have a third degree 
felony, driving under the influence," and agreed that there was no "reason sentence 
should not be passed." Id. at 2. 
Defendant thus abandoned his claim. But even if he had not, he could not have 
prevailed. Defendant claimed that the State had the burden to show that his prior 
conviction was based on a "guilty plea that was made freely and voluntarily" and that "all 
of [his] constitutional rights . . . were given to [him]" when he entered the plea. TT 69, 
73. Controlling precedent holds otherwise. 
An attack on a prior conviction "is collateral by definition" when a defendant 
seeks "'to deprive [it] of [its] normal force and effect in a proceeding that [has] an 
independent purpose other than to overturn the prior judgments.5" State v. Gutierrez, 
2003 UT App 95, \ 7 n.l, 68 P.3d 1035 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 30 (1992)). 
"On collateral attack, a plea entered with the benefit of counsel is 'presumed to have been 
voluntary' absent evidence demonstrating lack of voluntariness." Id. at ^ 8 (quoting State 
v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1987)). Consequently, both this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court have held that the burden is on the defendant in this situation to 
show that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. See State v. Triptow, 770 
P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (holding that prior conviction is entitled to presumption of 
regularity and that defendant has burden to "produce some evidence" to show otherwise); 
Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 at ffl[ 7, 11 (holding that "once the State has proven a prior 
conviction, a presumption of regularity arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant to 
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produce 'some evidence5 of involuntariness"—"a transcript, testimony regarding taking 
of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative evidence"). 
Here, defendant adduced no evidence that his prior guilty plea was not knowing or 
voluntary. Moreover, the record is clear that defendant had counsel when he entered his 
guilty plea and that he was advised of his constitutional rights. See R56-57. The guilty 
plea conviction therefore was presumed voluntary, and its use for enhancement purposes 
was proper. Id. at '[fij 8, 13. 
C. Even if this Court should determine that the trial court erred, the remedy is 
not reversal of his felony conviction and entry of a misdemeanor conviction. 
Rather, the remedy is remand for entry of a formal verdict and judgment on 
the felony charge. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the trial court erred when it did not more 
formally announce its verdict, defendant's remedy is not remand for imposition of a 
misdemeanor sentence. Rather, his remedy is remand for formal announcement of a 
guilty verdict on the third degree felony charge, for entry of a third degree felony 
conviction, and for imposition of an appropriate sentence on that conviction. See People 
v. Lucatuorto, 690 N.Y. S.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that "trial courts in 
criminal cases have the general inherent authority to correct their own mistakes," 
including, in the context of a bench trial, "the failure of the court to announce its verdict") 
(citation and internal quotation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. Alternatively, this Court should 
remand for formal announcement of a guilty verdict on the third degree felony, for entry 
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of a third degree felony conviction, and for imposition of an appropriate sentence on that 
conviction. 
*". 
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Attorney General 
i 
NNE B. INOUYE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
yU&L*y—• 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the [1 day of JJ^AIPU 2005,1 either mailed first-
class postage prepaid or hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to 
appellant's counsel of record, as follows: 
GREGORY N. SKABELUND 
2176 North Main, Suite 102 
Logan, UT 84341 
Counsel for Appellant 
fJEANtffiB.INOUYE 
L Assistant Attorney General 
U Y E r ^ 0 
14 
